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1. Introduction 
The expression “political union” appeared regularly in European Council Conclusions in 
1990 and 1991, in relation to the then ongoing intergovernmental conference (IGC). It was 
mentioned again in the Final Act of the Maastricht negotiations in February 1992, but not in 
the Treaty. The concept then disappeared from the European debate for 20 years, until 
Chancellor Merkel and President Barroso made use of it last year. It is open to various 
interpretations. In the context of this note, it is understood as ‘political EMU’: greater 
integration of financial, fiscal and economic policies within the eurozone, and the 
institutional consequences implied for the eurozone and the Union. 
The return of political union to centre-stage has been a product of necessity, i.e. the need to 
overcome an existential crisis of the eurozone. The arrangements and instruments set up to 
cope with the crisis have generated a change in nature of Union institutions, as the centre of 
gravity of common policies has shifted from market opening, trade and agriculture, to the 
coordination of economic policies – an area where the Union competences were heretofore 
limited to ‘soft’ coordination and budgetary discipline by means of peer pressure within the 
European Council. 
Economic policies represent the very core of national sovereign prerogatives. Under the 
TFEU, the coordination of economic policies is a matter for the member states to pursue 
within the Council, where decisions are taken by unanimity, while the Commission is 
relegated to an ancillary role (preparing analyses and recommendations which the Council is 
not bound to endorse) and the European Parliament has little to say. Therefore, it doesn’t 
come as a surprise that, as economic policy decisions were centralised to an unprecedented 
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extent, the European Council has emerged as the principal decision-maker and has resorted 
to intergovernmental decision-making and intergovernmental instruments outside the 
treaties, when this appeared necessary to overcome the emergency. The permanent 
presidency of the European Council has played a fundamental role in the process as agenda-
setter and effective coordinator and power broker of Union institutions and the member 
states – tasks that in the past belonged to the European Commission. 
However, the purely intergovernmental approach met its limits fairly soon and had to seek 
the help of common institutions, existing or created for the purpose. The reason is one of 
legitimacy: it became clear that direct enforcement of discipline by some euro member 
countries on other euro member countries was politically disruptive, both in debtor and 
creditor countries. The newfound central role of the Commission in the implementation of 
common economic policies decided by the Council and the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) – the most capitalised financial institution in the world set up to meet the eurozone 
members’ need for financial assistance – are a manifest expression of this trend.  
Meanwhile, fundamental questions for the future of the Union are being posed by the 
increasing differentiation in the member states’ participation in common polices, through 
treaty procedures, such as the enhanced coordination of Art. 20 TEU, or separate 
intergovernmental agreements. Equally fundamental questions of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability have arisen by the shift of economic policy powers to a no-man’s political land 
where neither national parliaments nor the European Parliament have a clear say.  
The process is far from concluded, as the eurozone and the Union tread their path along the 
roadmap towards a ‘genuine’ economic and monetary union. And the final outcome cannot 
yet be distinguished. However, while many institutional adaptations are starting to emerge 
pragmatically, the challenge posed to the existing institutional balance, within European 
institutions and between them, the member states and their citizens, may eventually require 
a new institutional/constitutional settlement. 
This essay discusses how recent developments have modified the existing allocation of tasks 
between the EU and national levels and the legitimising mechanisms in decision-making by 
the EU institutions, and their likely or desirable further evolution. We examine in turn the 
emerging increasing differentiation in member states’ participation in EU policies and 
institutions (section 2), the changing configuration of executive powers and its relationship 
to the community method (section 3), the criteria governing the transfer of economic powers 
from the member states to the Union (section 4) and the emerging democratic accountability 
and legitimising mechanisms before both the European and the national parliaments (section 
5). Some main implications for the future of European institutions are summarised in the 
conclusions. 
2. A multi-level and multi-speed Union 
The December 2012 European Council confirmed that deeper integration and reinforced 
solidarity within the EMU would apply first of all to euro area members (Conclusions § 3). 
However, it also stated that the process of completing EMU will be open and transparent 
towards member states not using the single currency and will fully respect the integrity of 
the Single Market (Conclusion §4). Therefore, not only does the door remain open for 
anybody wishing to join the inner circle of integration, but also the decisions and 
instruments of enhanced integration mustn’t prejudge the rights of non-participants in the 
broader context of the Union.  
Moreover, international agreements between some, but not all, EU member states are 
allowed only within the limits set by EU law, as the Court of Justice has made clear in a 
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number of landmark judgments (De Witte, 2012); and indeed the primacy of EU law is 
explicitly recognised in the Fiscal Compact (Art. 2.2). Accordingly, EU law may be resorted 
to in order to modify the provisions of the Fiscal Compact. 
Union members now fall into one of three categories: ‘ins’, ‘pre-ins’ (those wishing to join 
EMU but not yet able or ready to do it) and ‘others’ (those who do not intend to join EMU at 
any time). Because of the ‘pre-ins’, the Union is a multi-speed system (EMU as shared 
objective, but in a different time frame); because of the ‘others’, the Union is also a multi-
level system (EMU not a shared objective, in any time frame). The essential point is that, as 
EMU progresses, the large number of ‘pre-ins’ makes it plausible to envisage that the 
eurozone may one day cover much of the Union, although not the entirety. And indeed, the 
long-term objective of a eurozone extended to encompass much of the Union is reflected in 
the European Council’s determination that “the process of completing EMU will build on the 
EU’s institutional and legal framework” (December Conclusions § 4). Similarly, in its 
Blueprint (November 2012), the European Commission states that “the deepening of EMU 
should primarily and fully exploit the potential of EU-wide instruments” (p. 13).  
Thus, while the eurozone is emerging as a nucleus of enhanced economic and political 
integration, its future relations with non-eurozone Union members remain mired in 
ambiguity, as its members are not ready yet to say that they intend to build a new separate 
political body, while non-members oscillate between queasiness about enhanced integration 
within the eurozone, and an urge to participate in emerging arrangements and instruments, 
such as the euro-plus pact (23 members), the Fiscal Compact (25 members) and now the new 
Single Supervisor Mechanism (SSM, possibly with an eventual membership of 24 or 25), for 
fear of losing contact with the inner circle. 
Enhanced integration in the eurozone does not entail insurmountable difficulties in decision-
making for the European Council, which has already created within itself dedicated sub-
groups (the Eurogroup and related working groups). Reinforced cooperation (Art. 20 TEU 
and Arts 326-334 TFEU) provides for a modification in the voting rules of the Council in a 
multi-level system (which may imply a contrario that there should be no modification of the 
composition or voting rules of the Commission or Parliament). Specific rules for the 
eurozone (Arts 136-138 TFEU) also imply a modification of Council voting rules. 
In principle, special difficulties do not arise also for the Commission, which should be able to 
perform the tasks mandated by the European Council for the eurozone without modifying 
its composition or voting rules: this, however, is predicated on strict adherence to the 
principle of independence of Commissioners from national authorities. The perception in the 
public opinion is that independence has de facto been weakened in recent years. 
The question is more complex for the European Parliament, to the extent that it is 
occasionally called upon to deliberate on legal acts and policies affecting only the eurozone. 
Parliament maintains that it is entitled to intervene in these matters as a unitary democratic 
representative of the Union polity (see their Report on the Road Map of October 15); others 
maintain that only MEPs from eurozone countries could legitimately vote on eurozone 
matters and participate in related accountability mechanisms (e.g. the ‘Westerwelle Report’). 
To the extent that the eurozone will gradually come to cover most of the Union, the issue 
may become less controversial but will not disappear: what would happen in case 
Parliament was called upon to vote on a given decision or recommendation linked to the 
eurozone, and the decision was rejected due to the determinant vote of British MEPs? 
Clearly, the legitimacy of the decision would be called into question. The matter could be 
resolved by a gentlemen’s agreement, but there seems little doubt that over time a statutory 
solution, by means of Treaty change, will be necessary. 
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The strains on common institutions are also likely to intensify as these are called on to 
accommodate increasingly divergent policy courses, as may be the case with the Fiscal 
Compact or the SSM; all the more so as the eurozone solidifies its separate governance 
apparatus (summits, a permanent president and stable ministerial working groups), which 
over time could bring members’ positions in Council deliberations to be increasingly aligned. 
These strains may strengthen the attractiveness of the euro as the centre of gravity of the 
Union and the inducements for pre-ins to join. What is important, in the meantime, is to 
respect the unity and coherence of Union treaties. To this end, we need to fully exploit the 
available room – such as Arts 20 TEU (enhanced cooperation) and 136 TFEU (provisions 
specific to eurozone members), possibly in conjunction with 352 TFEU (action by the Union 
for which the treaties have not provided the necessary powers) – to accommodate different 
appetites for integration as well as, in due course, to bring back to the treaties those 
arrangements that initially were set up outside the treaty framework. It may be recalled, in 
this connection, that the Fiscal Compact (unlike the ESM instruments) explicitly provides for 
the instrument to be brought back to the treaty framework within five years (Art. 16). 
To the extent that the eurozone came to cover most of the Union, the position of those who 
do not envisage ever joining the euro may become increasingly uncomfortable, but this 
would not exclude that they stayed in the Union as full participants in the Single Market – 
albeit their weight in common decisions would inevitably falter. What appears more difficult 
is to accommodate demands to renegotiate existing treaty obligations since this would 
threaten the integrity of the Single Market and equal treatment of its members.  
3. Executive economic powers and the Community method 
As already mentioned, in order to address the euro existential crisis, the European Council 
has taken over executive powers in the area of economic policies that formerly belonged to 
national decision-making. The assumption of executive functions by the European Council 
predates the Lisbon Treaty and has extended well beyond the competence assigned to it by 
that treaty, but the crisis has given the process a new impetus. In order to fill the deficit of 
executive powers available to national governments, the European Council has started to 
take decisions immediately affecting the direction of national economic policies and even, on 
occasion, the continuing solvency and the political survival of national governments. 
Meanwhile, the ECB has emerged as a powerful institution able to stand up to the European 
Council with the strength of its views based on effective independent powers; its weight will 
grow further with the establishment of the Single Supervisor Mechanism (SSM). 
This evolution has resulted from the dramatic pressure of events, but the European Council 
lacks the unity and continuity of direction required by a true executive. As mentioned 
earlier, a process that started as intergovernmental, and was initially de facto managed by a 
Franco-German directoire, has over time been brought back not only to greater collegiality 
but also to an extent to Community institutions and procedures. As President Barroso (2012) 
stated in last May’s Europe Day address: “Never in the past have so many competences been 
exercised at EU level.”  
Indeed, the Commission has been placed at the centre of the strengthened procedures of the 
economic policy guidelines, the preventive and corrective arm of the amended Stability and 
Growth Pact, the new Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, ESM conditionality and 
adjustment programmes, and the implementation of the Fiscal Compact. Many decisions, 
such as early warnings under Art. 121 procedures or the decision to place a country under 
enhanced review, are taken by the Commission alone. Commission recommendations to the 
Council in surveillance procedures have been given special strength by providing that they 
may be changed by the Council only by qualified majority (‘reverse’ majority voting).  
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These new procedures cannot be confused with the Community method. For one thing, the 
new powers attributed to the Commission are in the nature of implementing powers of 
European Council decisions, rather than autonomous powers of initiative. Functionally, they 
resemble more the Commission activities as guardian of the Treaty than those of initiator of 
legislation. For another, there was never any doubt that the Community method is, and 
always was, a normative decision-making power, designed to establish directives and 
regulations (de Schoutheete, 2012): which is precisely why the Lisbon Treaty calls it 
“ordinary legislative procedure” (Art. 289 TFEU). Thus, to a degree, crisis management by 
the European Council has moved us from “economic governance”, i.e. a rules-based system, 
to “economic government”, entailing discretionary executive decisions. This is quite a leap 
from rule-making under the Community method that has driven integration in the Single 
Market (Dullien & Torreblanca, 2012 and Fabbrini, 2012). 
Moreover, the attraction of such incisive powers to the European Council cannot be seen as a 
temporary by-product of the emergency, but is likely to become a permanent feature of 
economic policy-making in the eurozone and the Union. The Six Pack, the Two Pack, the 
Fiscal Compact and the ESM are irreversible legal instruments enacting policies necessary to 
ensure the long-term viability of the euro and the Single Market. Therefore, one is led to 
wonder whether the Lisbon Treaty still provides an adequate institutional framework to 
accommodate this evolution of economic governance. Two main questions arise, as explored 
below. 
The first question is how to ensure a more stable and predictable structure for the emerging 
European executive powers in economic policy-making. The ingredients of a solution may 
include: 
 A stronger presidency evolving in the direction of a true head of the European 
executive. One possible route – but not the only one, as will be mentioned – would be 
to unify the presidency of the European Council with that of the Commission, as 
permitted by the Treaty of Lisbon and, simultaneously to give this president a strong 
and broad legitimacy.  
 The establishment of a European minister of finance and the economy, at the same time 
chair of the Ecofin Council and member (vice-president) of the European Commission 
in charge of economic affairs. His/her task would be to strengthen the enforcement of 
common policies, which would continue to be decided by the European Council.  
 Greater resort to majority voting within the European Council, notably by full 
exploitation of passerelle clauses (Art. 48 §7 TEU) to mitigate unanimity rules. This 
would not require a treaty change. 
The second question concerns the role of the Commission in the emerging institutional 
architecture of political EMU.  
 For many years the Commission has been losing its powers of agenda-setting and 
political initiative, which have been seized increasingly by the European Council. 
 At the same time, as has been mentioned, it has become the principal implementing 
agent and guardian of the new centralised economic policies. The effective 
performance of these functions requires strong expertise and full independence from 
the member states. They would not be helped by partisan politicisation of the 
Commission: indeed, partisan application of the rules of the game would rapidly 
destroy their acceptability by the member states.  
 To be seen as fair and objective in its decision-making, and therefore readily accepted 
by member states, the Commission must also remain at some distance from the 
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political decision-making in the European Council. Merging the two presidencies 
would create a problem in that context. 
 Direct election of the President of the Commission by popular vote is not well 
grounded in the emerging institutional equilibrium since the Commission is not a 
direct centre of political power. 
 In order to strengthen its independence and effectiveness, the Commission’s 
composition should be modified by reducing the number of its members. This would 
sever their link to the member states of origin which is important for the public 
perception of their independence. This would make it possible to restore the 
collegiality in its deliberations that has been compromised by the explosion in its 
membership. Greater resort to majority voting in its decisions would then again be 
possible, thus also improving its effectiveness. 
If taken to its logical consequences, our preceding analysis has implications that so far have 
not been fully recognised in the debate on political union. The ideas of merging the 
Commission presidency with that of the European Council, and placing the Commission at 
the apex of the Union executive, do not rest on very solid ground, politically or 
institutionally. Politicisation of the European Commission could make its decisions less 
readily acceptable by the member states; and the direct election of a unified presidency 
would unsettle the careful balance between the citizens of large and small states that lies at 
the root of the present system of double legitimisation of European institutions (people and 
member states, as from Art. 10 § 2 TEU). 
Which brings us to another implication of our analysis: to the extent that the European 
Council already has become, with the Lisbon Treaty, a Union institution with a permanent 
president and has de facto emerged as the top executive power in the Union, should one not 
take into consideration the possibility of strengthening its legitimacy, along the member 
states’ legitimising line, by having its president elected by national parliaments – based 
perhaps on a system of electoral colleges akin to that existing in other federal states (for a full 
discussion, see Fabbrini, 2012)? 
4. What economic powers? 
Following the ‘Four Presidents’ Roadmap’ (Van Rompuy, 2012), EMU will be built on the 
three pillars of financial integration, fiscal integration and economic policy integration. In all 
domains, the criterion driving the centralisation of decisions always was, and remains, the 
presence of ‘external effects’ of national economic policies – that is, potentially adverse 
effects of one country’s policies on other countries and the overall stability and sustainability 
of EMU – that are not taken fully into account in national decisions and therefore must be 
decided centrally.  
The crisis has brought two important changes. First, there has been a remarkable expansion 
of the notion of external effects. In the Lisbon TFEU, that notion amounted to a general 
requirement with little teeth that the member states “shall conduct their economic policies 
with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union” (Art. 120), as 
specified in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines recommendations approved by the 
European Council and monitored by the Ecofin Council on the basis of reports submitted by 
the Commission (Art. 121); and the excessive deficit procedure of Art. 126, with the attendant 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which was supposed to constrain member states’ 
budgetary policy to prudence but was weakened by the Ecofin Council decision, in 
November 2003, to exempt from its stricture France and Germany and by monetary laxity 
engendered by the euro in its early years of existence. 
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Now, after the crisis, we have moved to the entirely different world of the European 
Semester, the Six Pack, the Two Pack, and the Fiscal Compact, which have given the Policy 
Guidelines much stronger teeth – albeit their legal force remains unclear as long as the Court 
of Justice has no say over them – and have tightly constrained national budgetary polices, 
with strong, early and quasi-automatic sanctions for non-compliance. More important for 
eurozone members, binding policy commitments under the strengthened surveillance of Art. 
121 TFEU will now cover the broad domain of structural economic reforms, from labour 
market policies to the pension and welfare system, the quality of public spending and 
regulation, taxation, market opening and the like. As a result, countries will be less free to 
decide their preferred combination of flexibility and protection in economic and social 
policies. 
These constraints on national policies are meant to ensure the requirements that must be met 
for the monetary union to be sustainable in the medium-to-long term. So far, however, they 
have been left to national policy autonomy, in the belief that monetary union would bring 
sufficient market discipline to bear on its members to ensure convergent national policies. As 
it turned out, this was not the case, with the result that discipline and convergence will now 
be enforced from the centre. 
The second change is that the common economic policies involve rules and constraints, in 
the standard European tradition, but also discretionary decisions that can be taken both by 
the Council – e.g. when it authorises an adjustment programme or the disbursement of a 
tranche of an ongoing financing arrangement – and the Commission, in its activities as 
enforcer of common policies.  
In this context, subsidiarity is taking up new meanings depending on the credibility and 
commitment of national policies (and policy-makers): decisions will move to the centre 
whenever national polices represent a threat for the stability of the eurozone but may well 
remain in national hands otherwise. Therefore, the need to centralise polices may well be 
reduced to the extent that the new economic governance, and notably the banking union, 
managed to remove the incentives to run divergent national policies.  
In each of the domains of the Roadmap, the critical issues will be how far to go in the 
centralisation of economic policies and how to go about their legitimisation. We will discuss 
the former issue here, leaving the latter for the next section. 
Taking banking (and financial) union first, the crisis has exposed huge problems of moral 
hazard that encouraged bankers to take excessive risks behind the protection of opaque 
prudential rules and rampant supervisory forbearance by national supervisors. Inevitably, 
the way forward has been full centralisation of banking supervision and the creation of the 
new European supervisory authority at the ECB. The system, however, will not eradicate 
moral hazard as long as banks can expect to be rescued from their mistakes with taxpayers’ 
money: therefore, at least for the large cross-border banks, there is also a need to centralise 
deposit insurance and resolution procedures. Centralisation of the latter has been accepted 
by the European Council, while resistance to deposit insurance national has not been 
overcome, mainly for fear that centralisation could entail a pooling of existing national 
guaranty funds and, more important, of unknown risks. Some kind of last resort, fiscal back-
up for the deposit insurance and resolution schemes is also required, as a minimum in the 
form of a key to define national contributions in case of need – keeping in mind that financial 
requirements would in general not be very large under a well-designed prudential system 
(barring the case of a new systemic banking crisis). 
On fiscal union, the main ingredients of strengthened fiscal discipline seem well in place – 
provided of course that the European Council remains committed to serious enforcement, 
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which some continue to doubt – but two main issues stay unresolved. The first one is lack of 
a common fiscal cushion to meet an idiosyncratic economic and financial shock hitting one 
or some euro countries that would be capable of shaking confidence in the entire eurozone. 
As long as a larger common budget is unavailable, the eurozone could tackle this problem 
with some kind of mutual insurance mechanism or rainy-day fund, thus without any 
centralisation of specific fiscal functions. The possibility to have the ESM issue jointly-
guaranteed euro-bills for this purpose has been mentioned by the Roadmap documents as 
well as the Commission Blueprint. If on the other hand, one wanted to use the common 
budget to motivate reform policies at the national level, then the question of building some 
autonomous fiscal capacity for the eurozone could not be eluded.  
The second unresolved issue is how to build effective risk-sharing arrangements for 
sovereign debts to help restore normal credit conditions in the eurozone’s financial markets – 
while avoiding fresh problems of moral hazard and (significant) inter-country fiscal 
transfers. First of all, this requires firewalls, which, albeit with some limitations, have been 
provided by the ECB: events since the first Greek rescue package, in May 2010, have 
confirmed that a main trigger of the confidence crisis was doubt among investors that 
sufficient liquidity would be made available by the ECB to roll over sovereign debts.  
Restoring normal lending conditions may also require a one-off operation of debt 
centralisation to overcome the unwanted segmentation of financial markets linked to 
excessive sovereign debt accumulation by some member states; this was indeed sometimes 
done at the onset of other federations, e.g. after the US war of independence and in Brazil in 
the 1990s (Cottarelli, 2012). A workable scheme to this end has been proposed by the German 
Council of Economic Experts (2011) and deserves continuing consideration.  
A third dimension of the issue relates to the financing of large common investment projects 
with new public debt issued by Union institutions with the ultimate backing of its members, 
as already happens with the European Investment Bank (EIB) or the European Investment 
Fund (EIF): these operations would be self-liquidating as the project bonds are reimbursed. 
However, some member states remain reluctant to let the scale of these operations rise 
significantly to meet the financing gap that still hampers the completion of cross-border 
networks for telecoms, transport and energy. Undoubtedly, their completion would boost 
the Single Market in these domains and EU productivity. 
Finally, the chapter on structural economic reforms. One unpleasant feature here is that 
Council polices have predominantly reflected the views and economic philosophy of some 
member states, namely those holding the strings of the purse, which other member states 
had to accommodate without much room for discussion. The communication damage was 
amplified by creditor countries initially taking up a direct role in the monitoring and 
enforcement of adjustment programmes, but as has been described, this mistake has been 
corrected.  
However, what is more important in overcoming resistance to the prevailing economic 
policy philosophy is that it succeeds in combining austerity and growth, discipline and 
solidarity; to show convincingly that there is light at the end of the tunnel. To this end, at its 
meeting of June 2012, the European Council agreed on a number of actions, under the so-
called ‘Growth Compact’, that could bear significant fruit in terms of producing higher 
investment and growth, but unfortunately these have not yet been followed up as seriously 
as the austerity policies. 
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5. Democratic legitimacy and accountability  
The December 2012 European Council Conclusions say that “any new steps towards 
strengthening economic governance will need to be accompanied by further steps towards 
stronger legitimacy and accountability”, and that this should be ensured “at the level at 
which decisions are taken and implemented”. More precisely, it makes sense to envisage, as 
a general principle, an allocation of tasks between the European and the national level in 
which the European Parliament comes in when decisions are taken by majority voting, while 
national Parliaments should have a main say when decisions are taken by unanimity and the 
intergovernmental method. 
These formulations, regularly used also by the European Parliament, seem simple and 
convincing. But, in fact, they address only partially the underlying problem: in reality, many 
decisions will be taken at one level (Union or euro area), and implemented at another 
(member states), and they concern economic and social policies that frequently lie at the 
heart of the national political debate. Especially in times of crisis, some of these decisions 
must be intrusive and impinge on national decision-making.  
Democratic legitimacy and accountability are, in such cases, required both at European and 
national level: there is a need for double legitimacy. This implies coordination and dialogue 
between European and national levels of democracy. Whatever conceptual approach one 
may have towards the future of the Union, it seems indisputable that the Union is entering 
fields (economic, fiscal, etc.) where national democratic legitimacy is imperatively needed to 
support the (undisputed) formal legitimacy of the European institutions. That seems to be 
the central message of the (initially Delors and now Barroso) concept of a ‘Fédération d’États 
Nations’. 
Which brings us back to the German Constitutional Court decision on the Treaty of Lisbon 
(2009), which stated that the European Parliament cannot support a parliamentary 
government due to its limitations in ‘equality’ in the representation of European citizens and 
its inability to take (majority) decisions on political direction. In the Court’s view, correcting 
these shortcomings would require at a minimum “less unequal” representation of the 
citizenry and a harmonisation of electoral laws for the European Parliament. 
On the other hand, in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union’, 
the European Commission maintains that – as long as EMU can be further developed on the 
basis of existing Treaty provisions – “it would be inaccurate to suggest that insurmountable 
accountability problems exist”; but they consider that “serious accountability and 
governance issues would arise if intergovernmental action of the euro area were significantly 
expanded beyond the current state of play”, notably if “such action were used to influence 
the conduct of the Member States’ economic policies” (European Commission, 2012, pp. 35-
36). In practice, the Commission is reiterating its view that the Lisbon Treaty provides 
adequate accountability and legitimacy in areas where the Community method applies. But 
this is obviously not the case for economic policies, which are to be coordinated “within the 
Council” and were never in the domain of the community method. 
The prerequisite for proper scrutiny by the European Parliament of the new economic 
policies and institutions is their integration into the EU framework: which means eventually 
that the European Council must become accountable to the European Parliament, in forms to 
be decided. However, there is no basis for this in the treaties (Art. 15 TEU) and any 
suggestion going in that direction would need a treaty change, which would certainly meet 
considerable opposition.  
There is also no doubt that the Commission is accountable to the European Parliament also 
in its activities as the implementing arm of common economic policies, in view of the broad 
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language of Art. 17 § 8 TEU: “The Commission, as a body, shall be responsible to the 
European Parliament”. This designation certainly cannot be read as being limited to the co-
decision procedure. Since the Commission is the implementing arm of the new economic 
policies, the question then arises as to whether and to what extent the institution from which 
these policies emanate – i.e. the European Council – will be willing to accept some 
accountability to the European Parliament regarding implementing actions by the 
Commission.  
De facto, the European Parliament’s influence on ‘Road Map’-related deliberations by the 
European Council has been significant, as was apparent, for instance, in the SSM evolution 
between the Commission proposal of 12 September 2012 and the final Ecofin decisions on 13 
December. The assignment of new accountability mechanisms to Parliament is already 
emerging for the new institutions and policies enacted to handle the eurozone crisis. 
Parliament is also claiming a role in vetting all appointments to the new institutions.  
In response, the Commission has envisaged a special involvement by Parliament in key 
moments of the European Semester, notably the preparation of the Annual Growth Survey 
and the approval of Country Specific Recommendations, which in their suggestion could be 
formalised in an inter-institutional agreement between Parliament, Council and the 
Commission (as also advocated by Parliament). The Commission has also aired the idea of 
merging the Broad Economic Policy and Employment Guidelines into a single instrument to 
be adopted through ordinary legislative procedure. Similarly, it has suggested that the new 
power of requiring revisions of national budgets in line with European commitments could 
be taken as a legislative act by co-decision (European Commission, 2012, p. 38). Finally, the 
Commission has also proposed in the Blueprint (p. 38) to set up a ‘euro-committee’ within 
the European Parliament endowed with special powers to scrutinise euro matters and, in 
cases to be identified, even to act “in lieu of the plenary”. 
However, at least for the Guidelines, moving the decision-making away from the European 
Council would be controversial and possibly counterproductive. As indicated above, for the 
eurozone countries the Policy Guidelines are becoming strict obligations which tightly 
constrain national budgetary polices, with strong, early and quasi-automatic sanctions for 
non-compliance. To submit such constraints to the European Parliament would politicise the 
debate, making the system less automatic, and therefore less predictable and less credible.  
At all events, legitimising and accountability institutions at Union/EMU level will be built 
up gradually for each institution of the executive, as can already be observed. The common 
pattern that is emerging involves regular reporting to the European Parliament and the 
latter’s right to assess performance and ask questions. For instance, with the adoption of the 
Six Pack, an Economic Dialogue was set up between the European Parliament, on the one 
hand, and the Council, Commission, European Council and Eurogroup on the other. With 
regard to the SSM, Parliament is claiming a right to vet appointments, ad hoc hearing 
procedures, and a right to audit – which altogether goes beyond the provisions established 
for making the European Central Bank politically accountable for monetary policy.  
To an important extent, the legitimisation of economic policies decided at European level 
will also have to rely on national Parliaments (indirect legitimisation). To be sure, any direct 
implication of national parliaments in decision-making at European level (beyond Art. 12 
TEU) would be inappropriate and counterproductive since it would lead to complete 
paralysis. The domain of national Parliaments clearly is, and must remain, the preparation of 
national economic policy decisions, notably the national stability and reform programmes, 
that national governments will bring to the European Council in the context of the European 
Semester. Discussion of these documents must become the centre of national budgetary 
processes – which is yet far from happening.  
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The budgetary committees of some parliaments have also claimed competence in approving 
European financial assistance programmes – down to the disbursement of individual 
instalments, which initially (the first Greek bail-out) involved direct deployment of resources 
from national budgets. With the establishment of the ESM, an international institution with 
its own capital that lends money borrowed in capital markets, that arrangement has become 
an anomaly, rather than a desirable feature to be extended to all national parliaments. The 
SSM provides for additional involvement and scrutiny of national parliamentary committees 
in the oversight of supervisory policies, notably as regards their application to the national 
banking system.  
An opportunity for formal involvement of national parliaments in EU-level decisions is the 
new tool of contractual arrangements proposed by the Van Rompuy (2012) report of 
December 5th and mentioned in the December 2012 European Council Conclusions (§ 12c). 
Any such arrangement signed by a member state with the EU institutions would be an 
international binding agreement implying, in most countries, national parliamentary 
ratification (and if terms change every year, as seems probable, ratification or some approval 
every year). Because it would also bind the Union, it would need approval by the European 
Parliament. Thus, by establishing legitimising mechanism entailing a double legitimacy, the 
proposal introduces an interesting institutional innovation that may bear further fruit.  
The European Council, in its December Conclusions, stated that “new mechanisms to 
increase the level of cooperation between national parliaments and the European 
Parliament” could be useful, and recommends “the organisation and promotion of a 
conference of their representatives to discuss EMU related issues” (§ 14). A reference to a 
conference of parliamentary committees for Union affairs was already contained in Protocol 
No. 1 of European treaties (Art. 10); and the Fiscal Compact provides that the European 
Parliament and national Parliaments will together “determine the organisation … of a 
conference of the relevant committee of the European Parliament and representatives of the 
relevant committees of national Parliaments in order to discuss budgetary policies and other 
issues covered by [that] treaty” (Art. 13). Once it is clarified that these conferences will not 
decide policies at Union level, they may offer a useful forum for discussing general policy 
orientations and related institutional developments in EMU, and thus help build a broader 
understanding and common ground among elected representatives. 
6. Conclusions 
Four main conclusions stand out from the preceding analysis. The first one is that, while the 
eurozone is emerging as the centre of a drive for enhanced integration of economic policy-
making within the Union, it is not a foregone result that the broader EU-wide framework 
will be relinquished. The gradual extension of EMU to most Union members remains as a 
paramount political goal, significantly influencing and shaping the design of EMU 
institutions under way.  
The second conclusion is that the centralisation under way in executive powers for economic 
policy-making cannot be seen as a temporary device to deal with the crisis, which can be 
expected to recede once the crisis is resolved. On the contrary, the crisis has exposed 
systemic design flaws in the institutions of EMU that therefore require systemic changes in 
order to be fixed. This is notably the case for the new rules and institutions developed to 
ensure the consistency of national economic policies with economic and financial stability in 
EMU. 
The third conclusion is that the European Council is likely to remain the top executive power 
in the EU, with the European Commission playing a central role in the implementation of 
common policies, rather than initiating or deciding them. The community method is likely to 
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stay as the main legislative technique of the Union, but it is not likely to be extended also to 
economic policy decision-making.  
Finally, and as consequence of the above, the mechanisms and institutions that will be 
needed to restore adequate legitimacy and accountability to economic policy decision-
making will have to involve, on the one hand, a stronger role of national parliaments in 
legitimising national governments’ commitments in Council deliberations; and on the other 
hand, some forms of direct accountability of the European Council to the European 
Parliament, as difficult as this may appear today. Direct participation by national 
parliaments in decisions taken at EU level must be resisted as an institutional short-circuit, as 
it would in all likelihood engender decisional paralysis.  
The direct election of the Commission president, in this context, does not seem a very good 
idea, in view of the Commission’s increasing role as the implementing arm of common 
policies. This function seems incompatible with its politicisation. As an alternative, one may 
have to consider mechanisms to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the presidency of 
the European Council.  
Some elements of political union, as understood here, are already being put in place, for 
instance in financial and fiscal integration. In other cases, new decisions must be taken, and 
some treaty changes may be required to increase Union competence in the economic policy 
field, to adapt institutions to a multi-level system, to increase democratic legitimacy.  
This is obviously a considerable challenge. The exercise would be meaningful and 
worthwhile if it contributed, as it could, to a sense of purpose, a new confidence, a glimmer 
of hope. These ingredients are needed for growth and prosperity. They are essential to the 
life of a democratic society. They are clearly and sadly missing in much of the Union at 
present, including in the recent debate on financial perspectives. It must surely be the main 
task of political leadership to restore them. 
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